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Income inequality has increased across developed democracies in the past thirty years (Piketty,
2014). Conventional wisdom suggests that high income inequality should be associated with political
parties taking polarized positions as the left struggles to increase redistribution to its relatively poor
voters while the right aims to entrench the position of economic elites (Meltzer and Richard, 1981;
Han, 2015; Winkler, 2019). However, this general argument masks substantial within-country and
cross-sectional variation. I argue that the connection between party positions and income inequality
is contingent upon the construction of partisanship and the content of national elections. This thesis
uses data from European national elections from 1996 to 2016 to show that when partisanship is
expressed along economic lines – as indicated by a high degree of income differentiation between
parties – and when economic issues are salient, the predicted effect of income inequality holds. When
these factors are weak, however, income inequality has no discernible relationship with polarization.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Although recent scholarship, particularly in the United States, focuses on political polarization
in recent decades (or lack thereof) (Abramowitz and Saunders, 2008; Fiorina and Abrams, 2008;
Fiorina, Abrams and Pope, 2011; Hetherington and Weiler, 2009), the study of polarization is
hardly new. Giovanni Sartori’s seminal 1976 book, Parties and Party Systems, is one of the earliest
works on this topic, and it clearly recognizes the stakes in understanding polarization’s origins and
implications. Drawing principally on the Weimar Republic, Chile before 1973, and the French Fourth
Republic, Sartori writes that in polarized party systems, “...cleavages are likely to be very deep,
consensus is surely low, and the legitimacy of the political system is widely questioned”(Sartori, 1976,
120). Contemporary research often highlights implications that are potentially more positive, such as
increased ideological voting (Lachat, 2008), lower electoral volatility (Dejaeghere and Dassonneville,
2017), and diminished support for anti-establishment parties (Abedi, 2002), but it remains clear
that whether parties crowd together or stand near ideological poles has significant consequences for
politics and society.
Given polarization’s effect on these important outcomes, it is vital to understand why party
systems exhibit centripetal or centrifugal tendencies. One line of scholarship argues that parties
should polarize on economic issues under conditions of high income inequality (Meltzer and Richard,
1981). When income inequality is high, parties of the left should be expected to campaign vigorously
for redistribution while right-wing parties seek to defend their supporters’ wealth (Han, 2015;
Winkler, 2019).
In this paper, I argue that the relationship between party polarization on economic issues and
income inequality implied by the Meltzer-Richard model cannot be applied to party competition
unconditionally. Instead, the presence and strength of the posited positive relationship between
income inequality and party polarization on economic issues is contingent on the construction of
partisanship and the salience of the economy in national elections. In all states, there are a number
of bases upon which partisan divides may be constructed ranging from religion and ethnicity to
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economic position and geographic location (Lipset and Rokkan, 1967). I argue the connection
between income inequality and party positions depends on partisanship grounded in the economic
position of party supporters. Where different parties in a party system cater to divergent economic
bases, it makes sense for them to take extreme stances in the face of high income inequality. If
this is not the case, parties taking extreme positions are much more likely to alienate their own
partisans, so there is little incentive for parties to polarize.
The importance of economic issues in an election also has a substantial conditioning effect.
Even in states with high income inequality and party bases constructed around economic positions,
the salience of economic issues in national elections varies. When parties and voters deemphasize
economic concerns in a given election relative to other points in time, there is less to be gained
from staking out economic positions near the poles, so polarization should be lower than when
an election revolves around the economy (Alvarez and Nagler, 2004). In elections dominated by
economic concerns, parties are incentivized by their base and the focus of the campaign to stand
apart from one another rather than cluster together.
I test this argument using eighty-two national elections from twenty-two European countries in
the period from 1996 to 2016. The results indicate that income inequality’s positive relationship
with party polarization is strong when party bases are differentiated on economic status and when
the economy is crucial in an election. When these two factors are weak, however, I find no evidence
for the translation of income inequality into party polarization on economic issues. This paper
contributes to our understanding of party polarization by highlighting the moderating role of political
factors in the translation of income inequality into party polarization. Failing to include these
variables leads to results that obscure the complex decision and incentive structure faced by political
parties in contemporary Europe. In the following section, I describe my argument in greater detail
before discussing the data, methods, and results.
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2. MELTZER-RICHARD AND PARTY COMPETITION
Currently, there are two primary arguments that relate income inequality to the degree of party
polarization. The first argues that a higher level of income inequality leads to more polarized party
systems. The fundamental argument rests on the relationship between the mean income voter
and the median income voter (Meltzer and Richard, 1981). Assuming that individual attitudes
toward redistribution are the product of a voter’s position in the income distribution, the median
voter will always stand to benefit from redistribution, and the intensity of this position should
increase as the gap between the median and mean income expands (as the income distribution
becomes less egalitarian)(Meltzer and Richard, 1981). If parties respond to this increase in income
inequality strategically, then the expectation should be that parties in unequal societies, particularly
in multi-party systems, will take extreme positions relative to parties in more equal societies in
order to better represent and attract the support of voters. Therefore, party systems with higher
levels of income inequality should have some parties far to the left and some parties far to the right,
yielding a high degree of polarization.
Evidence from the United States appears to support this argument. McCarty, Poole and
Rosenthal (2006) find that income inequality (Gini index) and polarization, measured as the
difference between the average member of congress in each party using DW-Nominate scores, in the
Unites States have moved in tandem with both increasing since the 1980s. Han (2015) finds evidence
for this in a comparative framework, but he argues that this relationship only holds true in certain
institutional settings. Specifically, he argues that we should see a positive relationship between
income inequality and polarization only under permissive electoral systems, which he operationalizes
as having a high district magnitude.1 In these systems, parties face less of an incentive to compete
for the median voter, so parties are able to move further from the center when faced with higher
levels of income inequality. Individual-level data regarding the probability of voting for extreme
parties under different levels of income inequality also provides some support for the Meltzer-Richard
1I do not find results that replicate Han (2015)’s result using the methods and data described in Section 5.
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model’s application to polarization. Using regional inequality measures, Winkler (2019) finds that
the probability of voting for a party of the radical left or radical right is positively related to regional
income inequality.
Other scholars have attempted to modify Meltzer-Richard’s framework to better reflect the
realities of contemporary party competition. Pontusson and Rueda (2008) deviate slightly from
the Meltzer-Richard framework by considering two additional factors. First, they argue that
different types of economic inequality matter to different types of people. As many workers with low
incomes depend on wages as their primary source of funds, they should care about wage inequality
(90/10 earnings ratio), but the relatively well-off voters that constitute the core constituency of
the economic right should be more sensitive to household income inequality (operationalized as
disposable household income as this includes sources of income beyond wages). Secondly, Pontusson
and Rueda (2008) argue that it is important to consider the degree to which low-income voters
are mobilized. Higher levels of income inequality may suppress electoral participation, particularly
at the lower end of the income distribution (Anderson and Beramendi, 2008; Solt, 2008, 2010).
Therefore, when income inequality is high, parties of the left may have to moderate their positions
to maintain their vote share. Focusing only on the two largest parties in twelve OECD countries,
Pontusson and Rueda (2008) find that when low-income mobilization is high, left-wing parties facing
high income inequality take more leftist positions on economics than when income inequality is low.
This establishes that income inequality may not always be positively correlated with extreme party
positions depending on the strength of income inequality’s effect on turnout.2
Fenzl (2018) argues that income inequality’s effect on polarization, including all parties in a
party system, will be negative. This is partly due to the effect of income inequality on electoral
turnout, but also because under high levels of income inequality, right wing parties, which are less
sensitive to income inequality’s effect on turnout, have little incentive to move to the extremes. This
should be particularly true if the parties of the left moderate their positions. In such circumstances,
a right-wing party moving to the extremes may lose their own moderate voters to a left-wing party
moving to the center (Adams, 2001). In line with these expectations, Fenzl (2018) finds that income
inequality has a negative effect on economic polarization.
2As with the posited interaction between income inequality and average district magnitude, including voter turnout
in my models in Section 4 does not yield significant results or change the results substantively.
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Many scholars have argued that income inequality ought to have an effect on political polarization,
but there is no consensus on what that effect is. Three recent studies on this subject using very
similar data, come to contradictory conclusions (Han, 2015; Fenzl, 2018; Winkler, 2019).
Evidence from national elections in Europe from 1996 to 2016 presented in the following sections,
however, also indicate that the relationship between income inequality and polarization varies by
country. Figure 1 plots elections for four countries across time by their levels of disposable income
inequality (after tax and transfer), and party polarization on economic issues, the standard deviation
of party positions on economic issues weighted by vote share (Bakker et al., 2015; Polk et al., 2017).
The Czech Republic exhibits levels of polarization greater than or equal to that of Portugal with
substantially lower levels of inequality. The within-country trends are also varied with no clear
relationship in the Czech Republic and Portugal, a positive correlation in Germany, but a negative
trend in Sweden.
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Figure 1: Expert Evaluations of Party Positions in Three Elections.
In the next section, I argue that the existing literature has failed to take into account the
construction of partisanship and the salience of economic issues, which condition the effect of income
inequality on party polarization.
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3. PARTISANSHIP AND ISSUE SALIENCE AS CRUCIAL CONTEXTUAL FACTORS
Existing studies relating income inequality to political polarization operate under the assumption
that political parties are sorted by income with low-income and workers forming the key constituency
of the left and the middle-class and business owners forming the core constituency of the right.
Historically, we know that the connection between income level and party choice should not be
treated as a given (Marx, 2008; Rueschemeyer, Huber Stephens and Stephens, 1992). Even though
an individual’s income might be below that of the median voter, they may be a partisan of the right
because they oppose redistribution or because there is some other factor driving party selection like
positions on other dimensions, social identities, or the charisma of individual politicians (Greene,
2004; Huddy, Bankert and Davies, 2018). Critically, the social construction of partisanship is
absent in Meltzer-Richard’s framework, which assumes politically behavior is driven by economic
rationality.
As Huber and Stephens (2012) argue, Power Resource theory does a better job of explaining real
world outcomes than the Meltzer-Richard model because it acknowledges that an individual’s position
in the distribution of income does not determine their ideological position or party choice. Having
an income below the median does not predetermine ideological allegiance because class and the
political priorities of the poor are socially constructed. This is clearly evident in the contrast between
the rural and urban poor. The rural poor are more vulnerable to conservative cultural influence,
and therefore frequently support conservative political causes (Rueschemeyer, Huber Stephens
and Stephens, 1992). However, where organizations are able to construct a conception of class as
being grounded in the conflict between the haves and have-nots, which is easier in urban centers
where large masses of workers live in close proximity, political movements are likelier to support
redistribution.
Therefore, the connection between income inequality and party polarization should depend on
the degree to which economic position is reflected in partisanship. Parties that construct partisan
attachments along economic lines likely take positions that benefit their partisans, particularly if the
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income differences between partisan groups is high. This incentive should be greater when income
inequality is high. In other words, I expect income inequality to have the effect Meltzer and Richard
(1981) predicts only when partisanship runs along economic lines.
My argument rests on the connection between the degree to which partisans are clearly differenti-
ated with respect to income and the salience of conflict over economic issues. Group differentiation’s
effect on conflict has found support in other fields of political science, particularly in the study of
civil conflict (Stewart, 2008, 2016; Cederman, Weidmann and Gleditsch, 2011). In this context,
there are robust findings that the probability of conflict onset increases when horizontal inequality
(the degree of inequality between groups) is high. This informs the debate in the conflict literature
related to the contribution of grievances to conflict, which has often taken the form of economic
grievances (Fearon and Laitin, 2003). Overall inequality in a society does not appear at first to
have any robust role in predicting conflict because the important thing for conflict is how resources
are distributed between groups, not just across society at large.
Of course, there are many potential ways of dividing a society. For the purpose of this
paper, I argue that political parties represent relevant groups. This is appropriate given that my
theory relies on the connection between the economic position of voters and their membership in
parties. Additionally, Huddy, Bankert and Davies (2018) finds that the social identity approach to
partisanship functions in the context of European party systems, so party supporters likely view
themselves as distinct groups. Parties do, however, represent a more fluid type of identification
than racial or religious identities, but given that partisan identity is a strong, negative predictor of
vote switching (Dejaeghere and Dassonneville, 2017), I believe that parties are cohesive enough to
represent meaningful groups for the purposes of this paper.
My argument also builds on Lipset (1981)’s discussion of the importance of cross-cutting and
reinforcing cleavages for democracy. When parties draw on a diverse set of individuals along an
axis of political contestation (cross-cutting cleavages), they are able to work together because their
ideological positions are not so divergent and their constituents share some common priorities.
As parties begin to gain support only from individuals that represent a homogeneous sociological
position (reinforcing cleavages), however, the incentive for moderation diminishes, and polarization
increases. I make a critical addition to this argument. The degree of polarization should be reflective
of the difference between the sociological position from which the parties receive their support. So,
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if parties are highly differentiated with respect to the income of their supporters but the groups
of supporters are not that divergent from one another (for example the upper middle class vs.
lower middle class), then I would expect party polarization to be lower than when the groups of
supporters are highly divergent (bottom 10% vs. top 1%). Oskarson (2005) shows some evidence
for this connection. Using a measure of class voting, she finds that class voting is positively related
to the total span of parties on a number of dimensions. Evans, Heath and Payne (1999) investigate
a similar question in the context of the UK. Again, it appears that the social distribution of voters
between parties has an effect on party polarization.
To make the intuition behind this theory more concrete, imagine two party systems with two
parties each. In case A, the mean income of party supporters for one party is substantially below
the mean income of the other. In case B, individuals are randomly selected such that the average
incomes within each group of party supporters are equivalent. Between an initial period, t1, and a
later period, t2, the level of income inequality has increased in both fictional party systems to a
noticeable extent. How would we expect the parties to respond? In party system A, where parties
are distinct with respect to income, the supporters of the left party have declined in economic
position while the supporters of the right party have, on average, become better off. The left party
has an incentive to take a more extreme position in favor of redistribution while the right party
should do the opposite or at least remain in place, particularly if economic concerns are critical in
political discourse during t2. In party system B, which lacks partisan income differentiation, there is
no reason to believe that the parties will move apart from one another because increasing inequality
effects the two parties’ bases similarly. Perhaps the party system as a whole will shift, but that
does not necessitate an increase in the polarization of the party system as a whole.
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4. EMPIRICAL IMPLICATIONS
The theoretical argument outlined above implies several empirical relationships that establish the
importance of party income differentiation and the salience of economic issues as critical contextual
factors that moderate the effect of income inequality on party polarization. Under the standard
Meltzer-Richard framework, the principal expectation is a positive relationship between income
inequality and party polarization. My argument, however, suggests that the positive relationship
is stronger, if present at all, when parties themselves are sorted by income. If parties are not
differentiated by income, then the situation is akin to party system B above, and little relationship
should exist.
H1: There will be a stronger positive relationship between income inequality and party polarization
on economic issues when partisan income differentiation is high.
In addition to the level of partisan income differentiation, the salience of economic issues should
also condition the translation of income inequality into polarization. Not all elections emphasize
economic issues to the same extent, even in countries where parties are clearly sorted with respect to
income. Much like H1, a stronger, positive relationship between income inequality and polarization
when the salience of economic issues is high would provide support my argument that Meltzer and
Richard (1981)’s model translates to party politics only when the political context is taken into
account.
H2: There will be a stronger, positive relationship between income inequality and party polariza-
tion on economic issues when the salience of economic issues is high.
The above two hypotheses deal with the role of partisan income differentiation and economic
salience in moderating the effect of income inequality, but these factors likely also have their own
effects. Alvarez and Nagler (2004) find that parties tend to take more extreme positions on issues
that are important in a given election, so the degree of polarization on the economic dimension
ought to be related to how important economic issues are in general. The effect of salience should
also be interactive with partisan income differentiation. Where the salience of economic issues is
10
low, even a party system with high levels of partisan income differentiation and income inequality
may not be that polarized, but where the salience of economic issues is high, I expect party systems
with high levels of income inequality and partisan income differentiation, like party system A above,
to be more polarized than a party system with a lower level (like party system B).3 This argument
is reflected in the following hypotheses:
H3: The level of economic salience will have a positive relationship with the level of polarization on
the economic left-right dimension.
H4: The salience of economic issues will have a stronger association with party polarization on
economic issues when the degree of partisan income differentiation is high.
Finally, I expect higher levels of partisan income differentiation to have a positive relationship
with party polarization. Where parties’ bases grow apart, which may be the result of factors beyond
those pertinent to the Meltzer-Richard framework, parties should have an incentive to respond by
pulling apart from each other in ideological space.
H5: The degree of partisan income differentiation will be positively associated with the level of
polarization on the economic left-right dimension.
In the following sections, I discuss the data, operationalizations, and models that I use to test
these hypotheses.
3It could be argued that income differentiation and economic salience are endogenous to one another. Empirically,
the bivariate correlations between my measures of income differentiation and the salience of economic issues are
small and not statistically significant. The level of disposable income inequality is also uncorrelated with income
differentiation. A full correlation matrix for the variables included in my main models can be found in the Table 8.
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5. DATA & MODEL SPECIFICATION
5.1 Dependent Variable: Party Polarization
The dependent variable of this study is party polarization, which I define as the degree to
which parties take positions far from the political center in an election. In particular, I draw on
Sartori (1976) to highlight two key facets of polarization: the distances between parties and the,
“... enfeeblement of the centre, a persistent loss of votes to one of the extreme ends (or even to
both)” (Sartori, 1976, 120, italics original). In this framework, large distances between parties in
ideological space indicate more disagreement between parties. The vote share received by each
party reflects the centrifugal tendency Sartori (1976) discusses. Incorporating a party’s support
is also important because it prevents small fringe parties from drastically increasing polarization.
For example, considering the NPD, a fringe radical right party that receives a very small vote
share, equivalent in the calculation of polarization in the German party system to the CDU, a large
Christian Democratic party, would not reflect the reality of the party system. Weighting parties by
vote share solves this problem.
I operationalize party polarization as the standard deviation of parties’ positions on a given
dimension of contestation weighted by their vote share (Kim, Powell and Fording, 2010).4 I take
party positions on economic issues from the Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES) (Bakker et al., 2015;
Polk et al., 2017). This data source uses expert surveys to place political parties on a number of issue
dimensions in European national elections. This study uses data from 22 countries from 1996 to
2016 for a total of 82 national elections.5 Expert surveys have several advantageous features. One is
that experts are able to take into account both what parties say they are going to do and what they
actually do in assessing a party’s position on a given issue dimension. This increases the validity of
4Polarization is a contested concept, and as such there are many ways to operationalize it. Dalton (2008)’s
polarization index is used or approximated by Han (2015) and Fenzl (2018). My operationalization of polarization has
correlation of 0.978 when the same data are used to calculate Dalton’s index.
5I include only cases for which the salience of economic issues, discussed later, is available for parties comprising at
least 65% votes cast in the election
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expert positions as they have more observations on which to draw when positioning parties than
other estimates of party positions that depend on a single data source. Additionally, because experts
directly place parties on a quantitative scale, the method of aggregation is less problematic than in
other methodologies (Gemenis, 2013). It is also possible to evaluate the agreement between experts
in terms of party placement. In the case of the CHES, such validation indicates a high degree of
inter-expert agreement (Marks et al., 2007; Steenbergen and Marks, 2007).
Figure 2: Chapel Hill Expert Survey Evaluations of Party Positions in Three Elections.
Figure 2 displays the placement of three party systems in the sample to provide additional
context for what a polarized party system on economic issues looks like versus a moderate and low
polarization example. The size of each point indicates the proportion of votes received by each party
in the election, and the position reflects the assessment of CHES experts on economic issues. The
Czech Republic’s 2014 election, at top, has a weighted standard deviation of 2.766, which is above
the 75th percentile of observed values. This is not surprising given that there are parties receiving
large shares of the vote on the fringes of political space, which is congruent with Sartori (1976)’s
emphasis on distance and large vote shares at the edges of ideological space. The Austrian election
in 2006 is very close to the average degree of polarization in my sample with a weighted standard
deviation of 2.166. There are still large parties on the edge of the party system, but they are not
as far from the political center as in the Czech case. Lastly, Hungary’s 2014 election has a very
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low level of polarization (.342, the lowest in the sample). Here, the largest parties are all centrally
located and close to one another.6
5.2 Independent Variables
My first independent variable of interest is the degree of income differentiation between partisan
groups in an election. I draw on research in international relations and development to operationalize
the inequality or differentiation between partisans (Østby, 2008; Cederman, Weidmann and Gleditsch,
2011; Gubler and Selway, 2012). Stewart, Brown and Mancini (2010) provide a useful discussion of
intergroup inequality measures. These measures seek to satisfy the following four axioms:
1. Independence of the distribution from the mean,
2. The principle of transfers (Pigou-Dalton): transfers from a richer person (group) to a poorer
person (group) reduces inequality,
3. In so far as possible, to find a measure which is descriptive, not evaluative. This is not perfectly
achievable since any measure involves some implicit valuation, but we aim to minimize this
and hence will discard measures which have explicit inequality aversion built in, and
4. To measure group inequality as such, not the contribution of group inequality to either social
welfare as a whole (like the gender-weighted Human Development Index (HDI)) or to income
distribution as a whole (Stewart, 2008, 87)
The first two of these are borrowed from standard calculations of inequality for an entire society
(often called vertical inequality).7 The latter two are specific to horizontal inequality measures. In









prps|ȳr − ȳs| (1)
6Table 5 in the appendix displays the countries in my sample with complete data for all analyses, the number of
elections I have for each country, the earliest and most recent election, the mean polarization for each country on each
dimension, and the standard deviation of polarization for each country.
7Metrics of vertical inequality typically also seek to satisfy an additional criteria: “The transfer of an equal amount
from rich to poor counts for more than one from rich to less rich.” (Stewart, Brown and Mancini, 2010), but the
literature on horizontal inequalities typical do not regard this criteria as relevant for inter-group inequality.
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For my purpose, ȳ is the overall mean income, R and S are counters of the total number of
parties in a party system, ȳr is the mean income of party r, ȳs is the mean income of party s, and
pr and ps are party r and party s’ share of partisans. This measure essentially determines the
absolute value of the pairwise differences in mean income between all parties in the system weighted
by the proportion of partisans in each party dyad. Then, these absolute differences are summed
and multiplied by a standardizing coefficient.8 I determine ȳ, ȳr, and ȳs using the mean reported
income quintile of party members from the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) and the
European Social Survey (ESS). Both studies include items asking individuals to place themselves in
income categories and which party, if any, they feel close to. I require two data sources as neither
completely covers the cases in the CHES. In order to combine the two data sources and account
for any systematic differences that may be present, I use a model to predict the level of partisan
income differentiation in the CSES data using the ESS data. I then use this model to predict five
sets of plausible values for partisan income differentiation, run my models five times with a different
set of plausible values in each iteration, and then average the results from all five models together.9
I operationalize income inequality using data from the Standardized World Income Inequality
Database (SWIID) (Solt, 2016). One of the major difficulties in cross-national research using
measures of income inequality is comparability, as many data sources rely on different definitions of
income inequality. The Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) is the gold standard of income inequality
data in this respect because it harmonizes data from national data sources. However, LIS gathers
data in waves, not annually, so using only LIS data would result in a very low number of cases even
in Western Europe. SWIID uses LIS data as a benchmark against which to standardize income
data from a number of other sources. This source is ideal for my tests as it expands the number of
8In addition to the group Gini coefficient, a group covariance and group Theil index are also proposed. There are
differences between these measures (see Stewart, Brown and Mancini (2010) for more detail), but they are correlated
by design. Because the notion of income differentiation is somewhat analogous to a form of party income polarization,
I also construct the standard deviation of party mean incomes weighted by party membership as an additional
robustness check. Results from models using these alternative operationalizations are presented in the Table 10 and
Table 11, and they do not yield substantively different results.
9The CSES has respondents place themselves in quintiles (1-5). The ESS asked respondents to place themselves in
12 categories in waves one and two, but the ESS switched thereafter to using deciles. To make the two data sources
conformable, I take the empirical quintiles from the first two waves of the ESS and I combine the deciles from the
following waves into quintiles. To verify that my results are not the result of this process, I include results of my
model using only cases found in the CSES in Table 9. The results do not differ meaningfully from those using the
combined plausible values.
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possible observations by providing data annually, including data for countries not participating in
LIS waves. Specifically, because I am interested in the way partisan divides are constructed along
economic lines, I focus on income inequality after taxes and transfers (disposable income inequality).
Redistribution and taxes can play a substantial role in determining the income level of individuals
and the distribution of resources within a society, so income inequality measured based on income
levels after taxes and transfers gives a better indication of the economic reality faced by individuals
than before tax and transfer measures. Pensioners are a particularly good example of this. Because
they do not generate market income, measures of wage inequality interpret retirees as without any
income when they may be receiving government transfers, so disposable income inequality, which
incorporates the effect of taxes and transfers, better models the economic realities for these voters
and society overall.10
I argue that there should be more party polarization when economic issues are important in
a national election. I operationalize the salience of economic issues in national elections from
the Comparative Manifesto Project using Stoll (2010)’s socioeconomic salience category. Instead
of focusing on the balance of positive and negative mentions related to a given issue or set of
issues, I use the sum of quasi-sentences relating to economic issues divided by the total number
of quasi-sentences in each party’s manifesto, essentially the proportion of the manifesto devoted
to economic issues (Lowe et al., 2011). I then take the average for all parties in a given election
year to determine the mean proportion of quasi-sentences devoted to economic issues.11 I list the
relevant categories in the CMP data in the appendix.
5.3 Controls
I also consider potential alternative explanations for varying levels of polarization. One such
explanation is the increasingly multi-dimensional political space in Western Europe (Stoll, 2010).
The economic left-right division has been critical to politics since the industrial revolution, which
is often treated as a critical juncture in the development of party systems (Lipset and Rokkan,
10The mean and standard deviation of disposable income inequality and partisan differentiation (normalized to
have mean 0 and standard deviation one) between parties with regards to income are presented in Table 6.
11Ideally, salience measures would be derived from voter surveys or media records, but no data source of this type
contains the necessary data measured at the time of national elections for most of my cases.
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1967). The GALTAN dimension is a more recent development that is often linked to the rise of
post-modern value systems, the increasing influence of the European Union on the lives of European
citizens, and increased immigration flows from North Africa and the Middle East (Hooghe and
Marks, 2009, 2018).12 There is the possibility that polarization on one dimension will influence
polarization on the other. Because I am interested in polarization on economic issues here, I include
polarization on the GALTAN dimension as a control variable.
In addition to the hypotheses above, I also acknowledge that there are institutional factors that
likely play a strong role in the degree to which parties are able to polarize. I agree with Han (2015)
that permissive electoral systems should lead to more polarized party systems because they do not
induce political parties to compete for the median voter to the same extent as in a plurality system.
Following Han (2015), I operationalize the permissiveness of the electoral system using the log of the
average district magnitude. This variable is omitted from fixed effects models as it is constant for all
but four of my cases.13 I also include the effective number of electoral parties (ENEP), anticipating
that more parties in a system, particularly new, single issue, or extreme parties, will likely lead to
higher overall levels of polarization. I take these variables from the Democratic Systems around the
World Dataset (Bormann and Golder, 2013), which contains data from 1946 to 2016. Summary
statistics of my salience measures and controls are presented in Table 7, which is located in the
appendix.
Finally, I include a measure of the objective economic performance as a control. Han (2015)
and Fenzl (2018) both include such measures in their analyses, although their results disagree on
their significance. Due to my relatively small number of cases, I only include a single such variable,
the unemployment rate, drawn from the Comparative Political Dataset (Armingeon et al., 2018).
12This cleavage has alternatively been called the libertarian-authoritarian dimension (Kitschelt, 1995), cosmopolitan-
parochialism (Inglehart, 1977; De Vries, 2017), and demarcation-integration (Kriesi et al., 2006).
13The four cases in which there is an observed change are Belgium (7.5 in 1999 to 13.64 in 2003), Denmark (7.94 to
13.5 in 2007), Greece (dips in 2009 to 4.25 but returns to the previous value of 5.14 in 2012), and Italy (from 1 in
2001 to 23.73 in 2006). Polarization in Greece does dip in 2009 only to recover and subsequently increase, which is in
line with standard expectations regarding the effect of district magnitude, but there does not appear to be any clear,
consistent effect in the other three cases.
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5.4 Models
Because my data are repeated observations of European countries (each case is one country-
election), I have time-series cross-sectional data comprised of eighty-two complete observations with
twenty-two countries for an average of just under four observations per country. As stated above,
the relationship between income inequality and party polarization on economic issues varies both
between countries and within countries. I use a fixed effects model with panel corrected standard
errors by country to isolate the within country effects from the cross-sectional variation (Beck and
Katz, 1995).14 One shortcoming of the fixed effect approach is that institutional variables that are
constant within countries but vary between countries are dropped. These variables include much of
the institutional context, such as the electoral system. To overcome this difficulty and gain leverage
on cross-sectional variation, I also fit the following multilevel model with a country random effects
incorporating country-level institutions (Gelman and Hill, 2007):




+ β5IncomeDifi ∗ Saliencei
+ β6IncomeDifi ∗Ginii
+ β7Saliencei ∗Ginii
+ β8IncomeDifi ∗ Saliencei ∗Ginii
+ βcontrolsXControls + εi,t, σ
2
PolarizationI)
αc =γ0 + γ1ElectoralInstituionc + ηc
(2)
where i is a country-election in the set of all elections, I, c is a country in the set of all countries,
C, and t indicates the election year.15 Because my theory suggests interactions between partisan
income differentiation and disposable income inequality, between economic salience and disposable
14I estimate this model using the plm command in the plm package in R using the ’within’ setting (Croissant and
Millo, 2019).
15One potentially important constant is whether a country is Eastern European as these states have distinct political
histories from countries in the West. Models not presented here indicate that there is no systematic difference between
the two regions with respect to party polarization on economic issues. Thus this is not incorporated in the model.
Table 14 located in the appendix runs the models presented in Table 1 using only data from Western Europe. The
results are not substantively different.
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income inequality, and between partisan income differentiation and the salience of economic issues,
I also must include an interaction including all three terms (Braumoeller, 2004). Without including
this interaction of all three variables, I would be implicitly assuming that a joint increase in partisan
income differentiation, economic salience, and disposable income inequality has no relationship with
party polarization on economic issues, an assumption which my theory does not indicate and my
results do not strongly support.
An additional concern with time-series cross-section data is auto-correlation of observations for
the same country across time. A Lagrange multiplier test and Wooldridge’s test for serial correlation
in fixed effects panels both fail to indicate significant evidence of serial correlation in the fixed
effects models. Additionally, I fit two versions of the multi-level model, one with and one without
a first-order autocorrelation structure. The results from both models were very similar, and a
likelihood ratio test failed to indicate that the model with first-order autocorrelation structure was
a significantly better fit to the data than the simpler model.
The variables in this study are on very different scales, so I standardize all continuous variables
to have mean zero and standard deviation one, so the βs in the following results can be interpreted
as the effect of a one standard deviation increase in the predictor on economic polarization in
standard deviations. For example, if β1 = 1, a one standard deviation increase in partisan income
differentiation would be associated with a one standard deviation increase in the level of party
polarization on economic issues.
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6. RESULTS
In the previous sections, I argue that the effect of income inequality on party polarization
should be contingent on the degree of partisan income differentiation in the party system and
the importance of economic issues in the election. The results of the models outlined in Section
Four are presented in Table 1. Models 1 and 3 omit any interactions between income inequality,
partisan income differentiation, and the salience of economic issues. Models 2 and 4 include these
interactions. Models 1 and 2 include country level fixed effects (omitted from Table 1). Models 3
and 4 are multi-level models with country-level random intercepts. Because the multi-level model
does not eliminate cross-sectional variation as the fixed effects model does, I include the logged
average district magnitude, which has also been scaled to have mean 0 and a standard deviation 1.
Model fit statistics confirm in both cases that the model including the interactions is a substan-
tially better fit to the data than the restricted models. In the fixed effect models, the adjusted R2 is
substantially higher in model 2 than model 1. This is noteworthy as the adjusted R2 calculation
includes a penalty against the addition of variables, so model 2 improves the fit of the model despite
the addition of four more predictors in a model already including a substantial number of predictors
relative to the sample size.
There is a similar result in the multi-level model with the full set of predictors, which explain
a higher percentage of the variance and have superior model fit statistics. The marginal R2
indicates the percentage of observed variation explained without the country-level intercepts, but
the conditional R2 includes the country-level intercepts.16 In both cases, model 4 explains more of
the variance than model 3. Model 4 also performs better with respect to the Akaike information
criterion (AIC) and the Bayesian information criterion (BIC) (lower value indicates better fit) and
the negative log-likelihood (higher value indicates better fit). Again, the AIC and BIC penalize less
parsimonious models, so model 4 outperforms model 3 despite including more predictors.
16I calculated these statistics using the MuMin package in R, which calculates the statistics based on Nakagawa and
Schielzeth (2013).
20
Table 1: Results from Fixed Effects and Multi-Level Models
Dependent Variable:
Party Polarization on Economic Issues
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Party Income Differentiation −0.047 −0.144∗∗ 0.012 −0.069
(0.088) (0.047) (0.089) (0.078)
Economic Salience 0.100 0.310∗∗∗ 0.075 0.277∗∗
(0.088) (0.075) (0.083) (0.082)
Disposable Gini 0.278 0.817∗ 0.284 0.504∗∗
(0.440) (0.347) (0.174) (0.182)
Party Income Dif. * Salience – 0.195∗ – 0.231∗∗
– (0.072) – (0.082)
Party Income Dif. * Gini – 0.308∗∗∗ – 0.240∗∗
– (0.060) – (0.085)
Gini * Salience – 0.294∗∗∗ – 0.285∗∗∗
– (0.049) – (0.067)
Party Income Dif. * Salience * Gini – 0.141+ – 0.122
– (0.074) – (0.089)
GALTAN Polarization 0.124 0.243∗∗ 0.187+ 0.193∗
(0.132) (0.074) (0.096) (0.081)
ENEP 0.280∗∗ 0.122 0.153 0.172
(0.095) (0.084) (0.118) (0.106)
District Magnitude – – 0.465∗ 0.568∗∗
– – (0.177) (0.195)
Unemployment 0.097 −0.182∗ .079 −0.145
(0.116) (0.085) (.109) (0.107)
Constant – – 0.054 0.025
– – (0.169) (0.190)
Observations 83 83 82 82
Model Fixed Fixed Multi-Level Multi-Level
R2 0.256 0.543 – –
Adjusted R2 −.109 0.265 – –
F-Stat 3.157∗∗ (df = 10; 51) 6.053∗∗∗ (df = 10; 51) – –
Marginal R2 – – 0.306 0.381
Conditional R2 – – 0.778 0.890
AIC – – 186.778 169.625
BIC – – 213.252 205.726
Log-Lik – – −82.389 −69.813
Note: +p<0.10; ∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001
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Turning to my hypotheses (displayed in Table 2), the results presented in Table 1 generally
support my argument, but because my preferred models (2 and 4) include several interactions, the
interpretability of individual coefficients is limited as the main effects of income inequality, partisan
income differentiation, and the salience of economic issues represent the marginal effects of these
variables when all other variables with which it interacts are held at their means. Additionally,
because a three-way interaction is included, it is not possible to present the effects of my variables
of interest in a single marginal effect plot. To display more meaningful representations of the results,
I present figures containing panels of three marginal effect plots. In each of these figures, the
effect of the variable of interest is the y-axis, the x-axis is the variable expected to interact with
variable of interest, and the third variable is fixed at a constant value in each panel of the figure.
As continuous variables are scaled with mean zero and standard deviation one, I fix the constant
value at one standard deviation below the mean in the leftmost panel, the mean in the middle
panel, and one standard deviation above the mean in the rightmost panel. As my hypotheses do
not specifically apply to only within-country or cross-sectional variation, the following plots are
based on the multi-level model. Table 12 and Table 13 in the appendix present fixed effects and
multi-level models with each model containing only a single of the interactions. The results are
robust but slightly weaker, except the interaction between party income differentiation and the
salience of economic issues, which is in the right direction but not significant.
Table 2: Summary of Hypotheses on Party Polarization on Economic Issues
Number Main Variable Conditioning Variable Direction
1 Disposable Income Inequality Party Income Differentiation +
2 Disposable Income Inequality Salience of Economic Issues +
3 Salience of Economic Issues +
4 Salience of Economic Issues Party Income Differentiation +
5 Party Income Differentiation +
6.1 Income Inequality’s Conditional Effect
In this section, I address the results of my models with respect to the role of partisan income
differentiation and the salience of economic issues as conditioning variables on the effect of party
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polarization on economic issues. Figure 3 depicts the marginal effect of disposable income inequality
on party polarization with party income differentiation varying from its observed minimum to its
observed maximum along the x-axis. In all three panels, the marginal effect of disposable income
inequality increases with party income differentiation. Critically, this positive slope lifts the marginal
effect from statistical insignificance in every panel when party income differentiation is very low to
significant and positive as partisan income differentiation increases. This result supports H1 and the
larger theoretical point that the nature of partisanship in a party system conditions when income
inequality translates into party polarization.
Figure 3: Marginal Effect of Disposable Income Inequality on Party Polarization
Similarly, the results in Table 3 provide support for the importance of the salience of economic
issues as a crucial contextual factor. Although this effect is included in Figure 3, it is more clear
when the salience of economic issues is presented on the x-axis as the continuous predictor rather
than the fixed variable in each panel of Figure 3. I do this in Figure 4. Switching party income
differentiation to the constant variable clearly shows that ignoring the salience of economic issues
makes it impossible to model a great deal of variation in how income inequality relates to polarization.
As with income differentiation, when the salience of economic issues is low (at about one standard
deviation below the mean - economic issues comprising about 39% of quasi-sentences in party
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manifestos), even an above average level of party income differentiation does not yield a statistically
significant effect of disposable income inequality on party polarization.
Figure 4: Marginal Effect of Disposable Income Inequality by Economic Salience
Together, these two results provide strong support for the theoretical contribution of this paper.
Only when partisanship is constructed in such a way as to segregate individuals of different income
levels into different parties and when economic issues are critical in elections, income inequality has
the positive relationship with party polarization that the Meltzer-Richard framework postulates.
This makes sense because in these cases reality approaches the underlying assumptions made in the
model itself. Where parties are not clearly differentiated by income and economic issues are less
critical, however, income inequality has no discernible effect.
6.2 Beyond Meltzer-Richard
In addition to the theoretical contribution with respect to the conditionality of the Meltzer-
Richard framework highlighted above, I also hypothesized that the conditioning variables should
also have their own relationship with party polarization on economic issues. In this section, I
discuss the results from Table 1 concerning the effect of the conditioning variables outside of the
Meltzer-Richard’s model. With respect to the salience of economic issues, the expectation is that
parties should be more polarized on economic issues when those issues are more important in
national elections. Figure 5 displays the marginal effect of economic salience. Over most of the range
of party income differentiation and disposable income inequality, the effect of economic salience
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is positive. There is also some conditionality here. When disposable income inequality is one
standard deviation below its mean (a Gini coefficient of about 25.7, about the mean Gini coefficient
of Slovakia), the salience of economic issues is never statistically distinguishable from zero. However,
as income inequality increases, so does the proportion of covariate space in which the effect of
economic salience is significantly greater than zero. This result provides support for H3.
Figure 5: Marginal Effect of Economic Salience on Party Polarization
Figure 5 also provides support for H4, which states that the effect of economic salience should
be stronger in party systems where parties are more differentiable by the mean income of their
partisans. The slopes of the marginal effects, particularly in the center and rightmost panel, support
my argument. Looking at the middle panel, moving party income differentiation from one standard
deviation below its mean to one standard deviation above its mean is associated with a change in
the marginal effect of economic salience from essentially zero to about .5, so at that level, a one
standard deviation increase in the proportion of manifesto quasi-sentences about economic issues
(an increase of about 7%) is associated with a half standard deviation increase in the level of party
polarization. This effect is even stronger in the rightmost panel when disposable income inequality
is one standard deviation above its mean.
Finally, H5 expects that there should be a positive relationship between partisan income differ-
entiation and party polarization as parties operating in conditions with high partisan differentiation
have incentives to take more extreme positions on economic issues relative to party systems where
there is little differentiation. Figure 6 offers some support for this argument. Across many values
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of disposable income inequality and the salience of economic issues, the effect of partisan income
differentiation is significantly below zero or not distinguishable from zero.17
Figure 6: Marginal Effect of Party Income Differentiation on Party Polarization
The hypothesized positive effect is significant only when disposable income inequality is well
above its mean and the salience of economic issues is about half a standard deviation above its
mean. For context, this is the equivalent of economic issues taking up 49 percent of quasi-sentences
in election manifestos and an after tax and transfer Gini coefficient of about 0.31, approximately the
average level of disposable income inequality in Poland. This positive finding, then, offers partial
support for H5. I return to this finding in the conclusion.
17Notably, the bivariate correlation between income differentiation is positive and statistically significant. See Table
8
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7. DISCUSSION AND FUTURE RESEARCH
Income inequality and party polarization are two of the most important concepts for understand-
ing the politics of developed democracies. The period of egalitarian economic growth following the
second world war has subsided, and income inequality has begun to grow to levels not experienced in
nearly a century (Piketty, 2014). Time-series analysis has linked this increase in income inequality to
increased party polarization in the United States (McCarty, Poole and Rosenthal, 2006), and there
is some evidence for this in European democracies (Pontusson and Rueda, 2008; Han, 2015; Winkler,
2019). These findings fit with the Meltzer and Richard (1981) theory of political competition. As
income inequality increases, we expect parties to respond to the divergence in income by taking
positions that reflect the desperation of the poor for redistribution and the rich’s preference for
maintaining their wealth.
This paper enriches previous research by arguing that the positive association between income
inequality and party polarization is contingent on the construction of partisanship and the importance
of economic issues in a national election. Using nationally representative and expert survey data for
eighty-two European elections from 1996 to 2016, I find strong evidence for the relevance of these
factors. When partisanship is unrelated to economic position or economic issues are not important
in the election, income inequality has minimal effects. When parties have divergent economic bases
and economic issues are crucial in an election, parties are likely to take highly polarized positions
on economic issues. These contextual variables, particularly the importance of the economy in an
election, also have their own significant relationships with the degree of party polarization.
These insights are crucial in understanding contemporary political competition in developed
democracies. Not only has income inequality increased since the 1980s, but the mainstream parties
of Europe are also losing vote share to new parties. A direct translation of Meltzer-Richard’s
framework would predict that contemporary party competition would be increasingly extreme on
economic issues. However, parties that deemphasize economic issues to focus on issues of national
identity and sovereignty are growing at the expense of parties born from the class conflict of the
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early twentieth century. Where parties do not highlight the economic aspects of these issues and
partisan bases are not built along economic lines, my results indicate that even a high level of
income inequality will not lead parties to take positions that reflect the economic realities of families
in their societies.
The results of this study suggest several promising avenues of future research. First, the salience
of economic issues is a significant and substantive moderator of income inequality’s effect, but in
many cases, issues that have economic implications may be framed in terms of identity or community
values. For example, European integration has a clear economic impact on the citizens of member
states. However, much of the resistance to an ever closer union is articulated through appeals to
nationalism. The same can be said of issues relating to the movement of people both within Europe
and into Europe from its neighbors. There are arguments to be made regarding its economic impact,
but the issue is often treated as being as much about a confrontation of cultures and identities as
a matter of economic rationality. Similar points also apply to welfare chauvinism (Oesch, 2008).
The potential for such a connection is suggested by the significantly positive effect of GALTAN
polarization on economic polarization in both of my interactive models. Further research into the
framing of such issues should be carried out to determine how the colors with which an issue is
painted effect the responses by voters and parties, particularly under conditions of steep income
inequality.
The balance of cultural and economic frames may also help explain the curious result regarding
the marginal effect of income differentiation. Although its marginal effect is positive under some
circumstances, it is also negative or statistically indistinguishable from zero under some conditions.
Why would it be the case that there is sometimes a negative relationship between party polarization
and the clear partisan differences on income? One potential answer also relates to the framing
of salient issues. Radical right parties frequently emphasize their positions on cultural issues but
downplay or obscure their economic positions (Rovny, 2013). This may enable them to decrease
the salience of the economic axis of competition to focus on cultural competition, which may be
particularly effective at recruiting support among older, working-class voters. This relatively poor
demographic constitutes a key battle ground between the economic left and radical right (Oesch
and Rennwald, 2018). Understanding this dynamic is therefore particularly important given the
growing strength of the radical right in Germany and Sweden, where the Swedish Democrats and
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the Alternative for Germany (AFD) became the third largest parties in their respective parliaments
in 2018.
Rooduijn and Burgoon (2018) find that the poor are more likely to support radical parties under
conditions of high income inequality, but whether they vote for the radical right or left seems to
depend on additional contextual factors. When the economy is strong, income inequality appears
to push poor voters to the radical right, but the probability that poor voters go to the radical left
increase when the net flow of immigrants is low. Winkler (2019) finds similar results but finds
significant cohort effects with older voters more likely to turn to the radical right than left.
In summary, this paper finds that income inequality does have a positive association with party
polarization on economic issues, but not under all circumstances. Parties do not exist in a vacuum,
and their response to income inequality depends on the political salience of the economy and the
degree to which parties are differentiated by the income of their supporters. By adding context to
the Meltzer-Richard argument, this study provides critical insights regarding the realities of politics
in contemporary Europe. Not all elections are about the economy and not all party systems have
parties clearly divided by income. Where this is not the case, income inequality’s relationship with
party polarization is weak at best. When both of these conditions are present, however, parties are
likely to polarize on the economic axis of competition. To paraphrase Sartori (1976), when income
inequality is high, parties are structured on economic lines, and the economy is highly salient, the




Table 3: Components of Socio-Economic Salience
Name Label Description
per401 Free Market Economy Favourable mentions of the free market and free market
capitalism as an economic model.
per402 Incentives: Positive Favourable mentions of supply side oriented economic policies
(assistance to businesses rather than consumers).
per403 Market Regulation Support for policies designed to create a fair and open eco-
nomic market.
per404 Economic Planning Favourable mentions of long-standing economic planning by
the government.
per406 Protectionism: Positive Favourable mentions of extending or maintaining the protec-
tion of internal markets (by the manifesto or other countries).
per407 Protectionism: Negative Support for the concept of free trade and open markets.
Call for abolishing all means of market protection (in the
manifesto or any other country).
per408 Economic Goals Broad and general economic goals that are not mentioned in
relation to any other category. General economic statements
that fail to include any specific goal.
per409 Keynesian Demand Manage-
ment
Favourable mentions of demand side oriented economic poli-
cies (assistance to consumers rather than businesses).
per410 Economic Growth: Positive The paradigm of economic growth.
per411 Technology and Infrastructure:
Positive
Importance of modernisation of industry and updated meth-
ods of transport and communication.
per412 Controlled Economy Support for direct government control of economy.
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Table 4: Components of Socio-Economic Salience Cont.
Name Label Description
per413 Nationalization Favourable mentions of government ownership of industries,
either partial or complete; calls for keeping nationalised
industries in state hand or nationalising currently private
industries. May also include favourable mentions of govern-
ment ownership of land.
per414 Economic Orthodoxy Need for economically healthy government policy making.
per415 Marxist Analysis Positive references to Marxist-Leninist ideology and specific
use of Marxist-Leninist terminology by the manifesto party
(typically but not necessary by communist parties).
per503 Equality: Positive Concept of social justice and the need for fair treatment of
all people.
per504 Welfare State Expansion Favourable mentions of need to introduce, maintain or expand
any public social service or social security scheme.
per505 Welfare State Limitation Limiting state expenditures on social services or social secu-
rity. Favourable mentions of the social subsidiary principle
(i.e. private care before state care) .
per506 Education Expansion Need to expand and/or improve educational provision at all
levels.
per507 Education Limitation Limiting state expenditure on education.
per701 Labour Groups: Positive Favourable references to all labour groups, the working class,
and unemployed workers in general. Support for trade unions
and calls for the good treatment of all employees.
per702 Labour Groups: Negative Negative references to labour groups and trade unions. May
focus specifically on the danger of unions abusing power.
per703 Agriculture and Farmers: Pos-
itive
Specific policies in favour of agriculture and farmers. In-
cludes all types of agriculture and farming practises. Only
statements that have agriculture as the key goal should be
included in this category.
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8.2 Variable Summary Statistics
Table 5: Cases and Economic Polarization
Economic Polarization
Country # of Elections Earliest Latest Mean Standard Deviation
Austria 4 2002 2013 2.28 0.21
Belgium 3 1999 2010 2.41 0.13
Czech Republic 4 2002 2013 3.09 0.25
Denmark 5 1998 2011 2.28 0.21
Estonia 3 2007 2015 2.51 0.25
Finland 3 2003 2011 2.05 0.12
France 3 2002 2012 1.89 0.30
Germany 5 1998 2013 2.13 0.40
Great Britain 5 1997 2015 2.02 0.33
Greece 6 2004 2015 2.82 0.41
Hungary 3 2002 2014 0.57 0.20
Ireland 3 2002 2011 2.09 0.31
Italy 3 2001 2013 2.29 0.14
Lithuania 1 2012 2012 1.84 –
Netherlands 5 1998 2012 2.39 0.32
Poland 4 2001 2011 2.26 0.53
Portugal 5 2002 2015 2.79 0.19
Romania 1 2004 2004 2.33 –
Slovakia 3 2006 2012 2.62 0.11
Slovenia 2 2004 2008 1.38 0.25
Spain 6 1996 2016 2.51 0.46
Sweden 5 1998 2014 2.53 0.13
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Table 6: Income Differentiation, Disposable Income Inequality, and GALTAN Polarization by
Country
Income Differentiation Disposable Income Inequality GALTAN Polarization
Country Mean Std. Dev Mean Std. Dev Mean Std. Dev
Austria -0.524 0.204 27.550 0.520 3.055 0.369
Belgium 0.063 0.266 26.367 0.493 2.521 0.134
Czech Republic 1.471 0.624 25.500 0.141 1.719 0.255
Denmark -0.095 0.542 23.800 1.070 2.058 0.363
Estonia 0.400 0.511 32.733 0.651 2.032 0.564
Finland 0.083 0.658 25.500 0.400 2.155 0.754
France -0.266 0.505 28.967 0.961 2.702 0.154
Germany -0.972 0.900 27.740 1.339 2.003 0.247
Great Britain -0.528 0.704 33.700 0.474 2.169 0.400
Greece 1.143 2.033 33.400 0.623 3.034 0.480
Hungary -1.046 0.222 28.167 1.026 2.965 0.214
Ireland -1.084 1.527 30.267 0.451 1.754 0.110
Italy 0.081 0.934 33.067 0.577 2.701 0.319
Lithuania -0.260 33.600 2.172
Netherlands 0.385 0.632 25.800 0.652 2.032 0.246
Poland 0.489 0.308 31.650 0.819 3.176 0.504
Portugal -0.873 0.464 34.080 0.192 2.698 0.463
Romania 0.331 32.300 2.053
Slovakia 0.055 0.376 25.633 0.379 1.941 0.203
Slovenia -0.498 1.038 23.450 0.212 2.919 0.333
Spain -0.584 0.943 33.050 0.855 3.103 0.777
Sweden -0.030 0.353 24.860 1.110 1.776 0.437
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Table 7: Economic Salience and Continuous Controls
Econ. Salience ENEP Dist. Mag. Unemployment
Country Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Austria 45.885 3.336 4.167 0.979 4.260 0.000 4.800 0.648
Belgium 41.356 3.260 9.723 0.775 11.593 3.545 8.300 0.100
Czech Republic 47.451 5.460 5.761 1.688 14.290 0.000 7.175 0.150
Denmark 42.654 10.148 5.150 0.440 10.164 3.045 5.120 1.452
Estonia 48.784 0.980 4.963 0.211 8.420 0.000 7.700 4.063
Finland 56.976 1.905 5.997 0.417 13.300 0.000 7.900 1.054
France 45.536 8.307 4.923 0.522 1.000 0.000 8.567 1.069
Germany 46.043 1.771 4.400 0.701 1.000 0.000 8.400 2.223
Great Britain 40.894 6.807 3.554 0.289 1.000 0.000 5.940 1.303
Greece 44.751 3.497 4.599 1.826 4.992 0.363 19.833 7.548
Hungary 51.105 1.560 2.995 0.208 1.000 0.000 8.167 2.829
Ireland 53.511 7.939 4.110 0.330 3.890 0.052 8.367 6.093
Italy 45.734 1.664 5.790 0.488 16.153 13.123 9.300 2.663
Lithuania 41.545 7.206 1.000 13.400
Netherlands 34.661 3.873 5.977 0.660 150.000 0.000 4.920 0.760
Poland 42.958 5.582 4.350 1.120 11.220 0.000 13.875 4.882
Portugal 52.678 8.402 3.474 0.413 10.450 0.000 10.240 2.795
Romania 53.448 3.900 7.480 8.000
Slovakia 48.891 2.190 5.273 0.990 150.000 0.000 14.000 0.500
Slovenia 44.469 2.677 5.480 0.764 11.000 0.000 5.350 1.344
Spain 44.719 4.591 3.413 0.811 6.730 0.000 15.850 4.921



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































8.4 Checks of Model Fit for Multi-Level Model
































Figure 9: Q-Q Plot
There is some deviation from the theoretical quintiles in the tails, but the overall distribution of
points is acceptable, particularly given the small number of observations.
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Figure 10: Cook’s Distance
There is no objective value of Cook’s distance at which an observation becomes concerning.
Refitting the model omitting each of the observations identified in the figure (Czech Republic - 2002,
Portugal - 2011, and Spain - 1996) does not substantively change the results.
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8.5 Models using Only CSES Data
Table 9: Results from Fixed Effects and Multi-Level Models Using only CSES Data
Dependent variable:
Party Polarization on Economic Issues
Fixed Multi-Level
Income Dif. −0.223∗∗ −0.110
(0.557) (0.111)
Econ. Salience 0.405∗∗ 0.365∗
(0.111) (0.138)




GALTAN Polarization 0.268∗ 0.169
( 0.098) (0.114)




Income Dif.*Econ. Sal. 0.245∗∗∗ 0.291∗
(0.059) (0.108)
Income Dif.*Disp. Gini 0.434∗∗∗ 0.319∗
(0.093) (0.130)
Econ. Sal. * Disp. Gini 0.350∗∗∗ 0.358∗∗
(0.077) (0.122)








Marginal R2 – 0.391
Conditional R2 – 0.890
Log Likelihood – −54.378
Akaike Inf. Crit. – 138.756
Bayesian Inf. Crit. – 169.402
Note: +p<0.1; ∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001
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8.6 Models using other Measures of Income Differentiation
Table 10: Fixed Effects Models using Alternative Income Dif. Measures
Dependent variable:
Party Polarization on Economic Issues
(1) (2) (3)
Disposable Gini 0.787∗ 0.448 0.673+
(0.379) (0.343) (0.385)
Income Dif. (G-cov) −0.137∗∗ – –
(0.047) – –
Income Dif. (G-Theil) – −0.071 –
– (0.071) –
Income Dif. (Weighted SD) – – −0.025
– – (0.041)
Economic Salience 0.231∗∗ 0.218∗∗ 0.224∗∗
(0.071) (0.071) (0.069)
GALTAN Polarization 0.278∗∗∗ 0.243∗∗ 0.277∗∗
(0.073) (0.087) (0.077)




Disp. Gini*Income (G-Cov) 0.264∗∗∗ – –
(0.067) – –
Disp. Gini*Income (G-Theil) – 0.221∗∗ –
– (0.071) –
Disp. Gini*Income (W.SD) – – 0.212∗∗
– – (0.071)
Disp. Gini*Econ. Sal. 0.241∗∗∗ 0.253∗∗∗ 0.242∗∗∗
(0.046) (0.034) (0.041)
Income (G-Cov)*Econ. Sal. 0.111 – –
(0.069) – –
Disp. Gini*Income Div. (G-Cov)*Econ. Sal. 0.111 – –
(0.069) – –
Income Dif. (G-Theil)*Econ. Sal. – 0.108+ –
– (0.080) –
Disp. Gini*Income Dif. (G-Theil)*Econ. Sal. – 0.078 –
– (0.081) –
Disp. Gini (W. SD)*Econ. Sal. – – 0.135
– – (0.062)
Disp. Gini*Income Dif. (W. SD*:Econ. Sal. – – 0.055
– – (0.060)
Observations 82 82 82
R2 0.499 0.478 0.466
Adjusted R2 0.161 0.120 0.142
F Statistic 5.062∗∗∗ (df = 10; 51) 4.455∗∗∗ (df = 10; 51) 5.152∗∗∗ (df = 10; 51)
Note: +p<0.1; ∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001
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Table 11: Multi-Level Models using Alternative Income Dif. Measures
Dependent variable:
Party Polarization on Economic Issues
(1) (2) (3)
Income Dif. (G-Cov) −0.048 – –
(0.080) – –
Income Dif. (G-Theil) – −0.020 –
– (0.085) –
Income Dif. (Weighted. SD) – – 0.042
– – (0.073)
Economic Salience 0.212∗ 0.168∗ 0.212∗
(0.079) (0.078) (0.081)
Disposable Gini 0.467∗ 0.395∗ 0.440∗
(0.184) (0.174) (0.182)
ENEP 0.160 0.161 0.144
(0.109) (0.110) (0.109)
GALTAN Polarization 0.211∗∗ 0.175+ 0.203∗
(0.084) (0.086) (0.087)
District Magnitude 0.560∗∗ 0.516∗∗ 0.527∗∗
(0.192) (0.182) (0.186)
Unemployment −0.100 −0.080 −0.083
(0.109) (0.105) (0.105)
Income Dif. (G-Cov)*Econ. Sal. 0.183∗ – –
(0.086)
Income Dif. (G-Cov)*Disp. Gini 0.190∗ – –
(0.085) – –
Income Dif. (G-Theil)*Econ. Sal. – 0.154 –
– (0.098) –
Income Dif. (G-Theil)*Disp. Gini – 0.168∗ –
– (0.081) –
Income Dif. (W. SD)*Econ. Sal. – – 0.203∗
– – (0.084)
Income Dif. (W. SD)*Disp. Gini – – 0.151+
– – (0.085)
Econ. Sal.*Disp. Gini 0.234∗∗ 0.219∗∗ 0.240∗∗
(0.066) (0.065) (0.070)
Income Dif. (G-Cov)*Econ. Sal.*Disp. Gini 0.050 – –
(0.081) – –
Income Dif. (G-Theil)*Econ. Sal.*Disp. Gini – 0.055 –
– (0.092) –
Income Dif. (W. SD)*Econ. Sal.*Disp. Gini – – 0.052
– – (0.078)
Constant 0.020 0.035 0.033
(0.184) (0.170) (0.179)
Observations 82 82 82
Marginal R2 0.378 0.360 0.372
Conditional R2 0.872 0.854 0.859
Log Likelihood −72.018 −72.62902 −72.631
Akaike Inf. Crit. 172.546 175.258 175.2619
Bayesian Inf. Crit. 210.136 211.3588 211.363
Note: +p<0.1; ∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001
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8.7 Models with Single Interactions




Disposable Gini 0.516 0.541 0.262
(0.421) (0.397) (0.445)
Income Dif. −0.134∗∗ −0.049 −0.046
(0.054) ( 0.091) (0.088)
Econ. Salience 0.151 0.168∗ 0.117
(0.091) (0.066) (0.089)
GALTAN Polarization 0.285∗∗ 0.270∗∗ 0.276∗∗
(0.089) (0.083) (0.091 )
ENEP 0.162 0.074 0.122
(0.111) (0.116) (0.127)
Unemployment −0.087 0.008 0.102
( 0.103) (0.121) (0.112)
Gini*Income Dif. 0.295∗∗∗ – –
(0.067) – –
Gini*Econ. Sal. – 0.236∗∗∗ –
– (0.035) –
Income Dif.*Econ. Sal. – – 0.067
– – (0.088)
Observations 82 82 82
R2 0.369 0.387 0.264
Adjusted R2 0.042 0.070 −0.118
F-Statistic 4.513∗∗∗ (df = 7; 54) 4.879∗∗∗ (df = 7; 54) 2.762352∗ (df = 7; 54)
Note: +p<0.1; ∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001
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Table 13: Multi-Level Model with Single Interactions
Dependent Variable:
Party Polarization on Economic Issues
(1) (2) (3)
Income Dif. −0.052 0.004 0.020
(0.089) (0.084) (0.091)
Econ. Salience 0.108 0.144+ 0.102
(0.080) (0.080) (0.085)
Disposable Gini 0.384∗ 0.361∗ 0.275
(0.188) (0.174) 0.170)
ENEP 0.189 0.132 0.149
(0.116) (0.111) (0.117)
GALTAN Polarization 0.215∗ 0.195∗ 0.176+
(0.092) (0.089) (0.097)
District Magnitude 0.523∗∗ 0.485∗ 0.462∗
(0.196) (0.180) (0.172)
Unemployment −0.053 0.010 0.083
(0.119) (0.104) (0.109)
Inc. Dif. *Gini 0.217∗ – –
(0.094) – –
Econ. Sal.*Gini – 0.220∗∗ –
– (0.067) –
Inc. Dif.*Econ. Sal. – – 0.126
– – (0.094)
Constant 0.047 0.047 0.049
(0.187) (0.173) 0.164)
Observations 82 82 82
Marginal R2 0.293 0.364 0.319
Conditional R2 0.831 0.833 0.769
Log Likelihood −79.943 −76.948 −81.396
Akaike Inf. Crit. 183.8853 177.8967 186.792
Bayesian Inf. Crit. 212.766 206.777 215.673
Note: +p<0.1; ∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001
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8.8 Models Using Only Data from Western Europe
Table 14: Results from Fixed Effects and Multi-Level Models Using only Western European Data
Dependent variable:
Party Polarization on Economic Issues
Fixed Multi-Level
Income Dif. −0.187∗∗ −0.121
(0.065) (0.091)
Econ. Salience 0.295∗∗∗ 0.268∗∗
(0.062) (0.084)




GALTAN Polarization 0.283∗∗∗ 0.236∗∗
( 0.068) (0.084)




Income Dif.*Econ. Sal. 0.179+ 0.189∗
(0.088) (0.091)
Income Dif.*Disp. Gini 0.402∗∗∗ 0.284∗
(0.080) (0.105)
Econ. Sal. * Disp. Gini 0.314∗∗∗ 0.251∗∗
(0.049) (0.070)







F-Stat 5.058∗∗∗ (10 and 37 DF) –
Marginal R2 – 0.551
Conditional R2 – 0.727
Log Likelihood – −37.43458
Akaike Inf. Crit. – 105.2691
Bayesian Inf. Crit. – 137.3544
Note: +p<0.1; ∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001
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